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FEDERALISM AND THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION: A
CUTTING EDGE AMIDST PROFESSIONS OF
RESTRAINT
DONALD E. LIVELY*
The concept of federalism pervades much discussion and debate
over the Constitution, even as its actual wellspring and precise meaning
tend to be obscured or elusive. Concern with perceived imperatives of
federalism has influenced the development of principle across a broad
spectrum of constitutional interests. Few areas of constitutional deci-
sion-making are immune from direct or indirect reference to federal-
ism. Concern with federalism is a common analytical denominator that
has helped define not only the scope of federal and state powers' but
the contours of fundamental rights and liberties.2
Understanding a particular Court's vision and prioritization of
federalism affords a meaningful basis for predicting general constitu-
tional trends and developments. Review of nearly two centuries of
constitutional case law supports the proposition that the higher the
value attached to federalism, the less likely it is that the judiciary will
broadly define national powers.3 Equally improbable is that a similarly
* William J. Maier, Jr. Chair of Law, West Virginia University College of Law;
J.D. University of California, Los Angeles; M.S. Northwestern University; A.B. University of
California, Berkeley.
1. Typifying concern with federalism is analysis of Congress' power to regulate com-
merce among the states in the form of law that also impacts local activity. Case law over
the course of history has swung from an expansive charting of federal power (e.g., Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824) (extending congressional authority to wherever
commerce present)), to a narrow definition of commerce related strictly to transit and accen-
tuating the Tenth Amendment (e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (holding
that Congress may not regulate conditions of production)), and back to a generous accom-
modation of federal regulatory power (e.g., Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 113, 120 (1942)
(holding that Congress may regulate activities having close and substantial effect upon com-
merce)).
2. E.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1984) (holding that fundamental
right to privacy does not include protection against legislative restrictions upon homosexual
activity).
3. In less than two decades, for example, the Court vacillated between doctrine that
1
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situated Court will reference enumerated rights and liberties or the
amorphous concepts of due process or equal protection to defeat state
interests.4
Like many of the literal terms of the Constitution that it is
brigaded with -for purposes of developing principle, federalism is not
self-defining.5 It thus is a magnet for competitive theorizing and agen-
da-driven management. Stripped of the embellishments that may define
its utility in ends-oriented fashion, the concept of federalism derives
from the constitutionally directed division of authority between national
and state governments. Although not textually designated, federalism
has been classified as one "[o]f the various structural elements in the
Constitution [along with] separation of powers, checks and balances,
[and] judicial review" implied by the framers' invention.6
Among the core values associated with federalism are "the pro-
motion of state experimentation and local democracy."7 Such consider-
ations have had notable impact upon the coursing of constitutional law
generally. In the post-Warren era, federalism has been an especially
significant factor in relaxing federal constitutional constraints upon state
criminal procedure. Accommodation of the diverse methods that might
be concocted in state political laboratories accounts primarily for the
half-century delay between adopting the exclusionary rule in federal
courts and incorporating it through the Fourteenth Amendment.8 Simi-
narrowly, broadly, and again narrowly defined state immunity from federal regulation. Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (overruling National League of
Cities); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (overruling Wirtz); Mary-
land v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968). Criticism of those rulings stressed that federalism [re-
spectively] was being disregarded and overindulged. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 568-77 (Powell, J.,
dissenting); National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 856-80 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Wirtz,
392 U.S. at 201-05 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
4. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (accommodating
state interest in statutory rape law applied only against males).
5. For a discussion of the vague and open-ended terms of the Constitution's key
provisions, see DONALD E. LIVELY, FORESHADOWS OF THE LAW xix (1992).
6. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1637 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
7. Sheldon Nahmod, State Constitutional Torts: Deshaney, Reverse-Federalism and
Community, 26 RUT3GERS L.J. 949, 950 (1995).
8. The exclusionary rule was adopted at the federal level in Weeks v. United States,




West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 98, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 11
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol98/iss3/11
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
lar deference to the imperatives of federalism explains the passage of
two decades between the Court's insistence upon exclusion from feder-
al trials of confessions, obtained during illegal detention, and its ruling
that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applied to
the states.9  Prior to the Warren Court's heightened emphasis upon
defendant rights, federalism thus was a primary factor in the crafting
of Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment guarantees pertinent to the
criminal justice system. Even in stressing federal constitutional interests
to account for police abuse or overreaching, case law reflected a wari-
ness toward forcing particular methods of protection upon the states.
Although acknowledging that Fourth Amendment textual guarantees
passed through the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court in Wolf v. Colo-
rado"0 asserted that the method of protecting the constitutional interest
presented a different question." As Justice Frankfurter put it:
How such arbitrary conduct should be checked, what remedies against it
should be afforded, the means by which the right should be made effec-
tive, are all questions that are not to be so dogmatically answered so as to
preclude the varying solutions which spring from an allowable range of
judgment on issues not susceptible of quantitative solution.'
The utility of federalism in diluting constitutionally driven gover-
nance of state police practices is well-established. Regulation of crime,
like control of public education, historically has been understood as an
essentially local function.'3 So strong is conventional understanding of
the relationship between criminality and state interest that logic and
even constitutional directive at times have been ignored. Federalism's
utility in defeating rather than facilitating constitutional imperatives was
seminally illustrated midway through Reconstruction. Soon after the
Fourteenth Amendment and its statutory antecedent (the Civil Rights
Act of 1866) were adopted, 4 the Court in Blyew v. United States 5
9. Exclusion of confessions obtained during illegal detention rested upon the Court's
supervisory power over the federal judiciary. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332
(1943). A federal constitutional interest in statements obtained in the course of custodial
interrogation eventually was asserted in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
10. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
11. Id. at 28.
12. Id.
13. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1637 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
14. For a discussion of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as the preordination of the Four-
1996]
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revealed its functional resistance to the redefinition of federal and state
powers to fornally achieve the Reconstruction-mandated transfer of
control over creating and protecting civil rights. 6
At issue in Blyew was a federal prosecution of a white man
charged with murdering a black woman. 7 The proceeding commenced
under the 1866 Act's provision empowering federal courts to hear all
criminal and civil cases "'affecting persons who are denied, or cannot
enforce in the courts or judicial tribunals of the State, or locality,
where they may be, any of the rights secured to them by the first
section of the act.""... Because all witnesses to the incident were
black, and state law prohibited cross-racial testimony, the state had
refused to prosecute. 9 Notwithstanding the circumstances, the Court
concluded that neither the witnesses nor the deceased were "affected
persons."2 The result, as Justice Bradley noted, was "[t]o deprive a
whole class of the community of this right, . . . to brand them with a
badge of slavery[,] ...to expose them to wanton insults and fiendish
assaults[,] . . . leav[ing] their lives, their families, and their property
unprotected by law."'
If not a finther indication of slighting constitutional reality, the
Court's most recent excursion into federalism and the criminal justice
system suggests the possibility of a similarly protectionist instinct in
favor of potentially obsolete structures. Striking down a federal law
prohibiting firearms in areas surrounding schools, in United States v.
Lopez 2 the Court evinced concern with traditional order and political
teenth Amendment, see HAROLD HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION (1973).
15. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581 (1871).
16. Id at 581. The redistribution of power over the terms of American citizenship and
the contours of civil rights is discussed in DONALD E. LIVELY, THE CONSTITUTION AND
RACE 48-56 (1993).
17. Blyew, 80 U.S. at 591.
18. Id. (quoting the Civil Rights Act, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866)). The Act prohibited
discrimination on the basis of race with respect to contracts, suing, giving evidence, property
rights, civil and criminal proceedings, and punishment. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess.
474 (1866).
19. Blyew, 80 U.S. at 591.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 599 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
22. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
[Vol. 98:923
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ramifications. Without some meaningful limiting principle for the com-
merce power, the Court stressed, it may prove impossible "to identify
any activity that the States may regulate but Congress may not."23
Notwithstanding the simple reality etched by Justice Stevens, that
"[g]uns are both articles of commerce and articles that can be used to
restrain commerce,"24 decisional rhetoric suggests an interest in craft-
ing principle responding to the Court's own sense of exigency and
idealism.
Attentive to the implications of the republic's evolution from
disaggregated economic units to a national market, the Lopez Court
departed from a six decade long tradition of deference to Congress'
competence, judgment and reach under the commerce power.2 The
divergence was not without some acknowledgment "of much uncertain-
ty respecting the existence, and the content of standards that allow the
judiciary to play a significant role in maintaining the design contem-
plated by the Framers."26 Nor has it avoided claims of abandoning "'a
paradigm of judicial restraint."' 27 Especially if critical perceptions are
accurate, and the Court's exercise is merely a variant of
noninterpretivism, s federalism may be viewable as the analytical anti-
christ to substantive due process review.
Aggressive referencing of federalism over the past quarter century
in the criminal justice context, for instance, reflects a significant politi-
cal inspiration. During the 1968 presidential election, the constitutional
output of the Warren Court emerged as a dominant issue. Richard
Nixon's campaign priorities included a pledge to appoint Supreme
Court justices who would reverse the trend of expanding defendant's
23. Id. at 1632.
24. Id. at 1651 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
25. As Justice Souter noted, since the Court's decision in United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 147-48 (1938), "deference to legislative judgments on commer-
cial regulation [has been] the powerful theme under both the Due Process and Commerce
Clauses." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1653 (Souter, J., dissenting).
26. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1635 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 1651 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc.,
113 S. Ct. 2096, 2101 (1993)).
28. Noninterpretivist review touts the legitimacy of the judiciary referencing values that
are not grounded in constitutional text. Noninterpretivist theory is exemplified and amplified
in MICHAEL PERRY, THE CONSTITUTmON, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982).
1996]
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rights.2 9 After being elected, President Nixon fulfilled his promise to
nominate persons disfavoring usage of the Constitution as a cutting
edge against state criminal processes." Nixon appointees, including
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist, Blackmun, and Powell,
helped erect significant curbs upon doctrine inherited from the Warren
Court. Despite accepting the exclusionary rule, the Burger Court initiat-
ed a constitutional counterinsurgency generating among other things
good faith concepts that excuse police from otherwise binding consti-
tutional requirements."
A significant instrumentality in negating the work of the Warren
Court also has been federalism. Proceeding on a parallel track with
redefinitive principles comprehending both federal and state practices,
such as the good faith exception, federalism has played a more subtle
and discrete role in redacting the Warren legacy. It has been a primary
reference point in diminishing the functionality of federal habeas cor-
pus rights. By largely denying retroactive application of new constitu-
tional rules in such cases,32 the modem Court largely has transformed
habeas relief into a formalism.3  Downsizing the role of the
exclusionary rule has been justified in significant part on grounds that
states may provide alternative forms of relief that do not so heavily
encumber prosecutorial interests.34 The continuing vitality of Miranda
29. HENRY ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS 4, 12 (1974); BOB WOODWARD &
SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 159-61 (1979).
30. The criteria for Nixon's Supreme Court nominees, and their performance once con-
firmed, is discussed in DONALD E. LIVELY, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE CONSENT OF THE
GOVERNED: ACTIVIST WAYS AND POPULAR ENDS 138 (1990).
31. Each of Nixon's appointees endorsed adoption of the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
32. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion). Exceptions to
nonretroactivity are the rare instances in which a habeas petitioner demonstrates that a new
rule is so fundamental as to be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" or that the con-
duct resulting in conviction was constitutionally protected. Id. at 307-08 (O'Connor, J., plu-
rality opinion) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)); Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302, 313-14 (1989).
33. The Court has determined that a rule is new if reasonable minds could differ over
the meaning of preceding decisions. Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990). Avoiding the
new rule trap for retroactivity in habeas cases thus is vexing to the extent that constitutional
litigation typically is begotten by reasonable differences of opinion.
34. To the extent that alternative remedies have been touted, such as tort actions and
community pressure, analysis mirrors some of the basic premises of Wolf v. Colorado, 338
928 [Vol. 98:923
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requirements,35  even if narrowly deployed by the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts,36 may attest less to federalism's dilution in the Fifth
Amendment context than to recognition that the rules are minimally
intrusive upon state practice.37
Beyond the context of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments,
accommodation of death penalty statutes over the past two decades has
been grounded partly in federalism.38 Even case law that comports
with national constitutional values in some instances is better under-
stood as the product of federalistic impulses. The determination that
cameras in the courtroom are not a per se violation of due process,39
for example, is consonant to a significant degree with an outcome that
would be generated by First Amendment analysis. The Court in Chan-
dler v. Florida," however, emphasized that its holding was driven not
by First Amendment considerations but by an interest in affording
breathing room to the differing methods and priorities of the states. In
the Court's words, the "concept of federalism . . . must guide our
decision."4' The meaning of that concept, adverted to by the
Rehnquist Court, thus appears to be as elusive, malleable and assailable
as the "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" or "rooted in the
nation's traditions" standards enshrined in fundamental rights analy-
sis."
U.S. 25 (1949).
35. When "a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation," police are required
first to warn of the right to remain silent, that anything said can and will be used against
the individual in court, that there is a right to have counsel present during interrogation and
that a lawyer will be appointed if the person can afford one. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966).
36. Miranda's post-Warren legacy is discussed in STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL
J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 525-74 (4th ed. 1992).
37. The proposition that Miranda has had negligible impact upon police practices is
set forth in OTIS H. STEPHENS, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT (1973).
38. E.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 333-34 (1989) (rejecting an "emerging
national consensus against execution of the mentally retarded").
39. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 578-79 (1981).
40. 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
41. Id. at 578-79.
42. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
1996]
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As the common thread that has woven a constitutional fabric rub-
bing state criminal processes less abrasively than the Warren Court's
doctrinal cloth, federalism has demonstrated its utility. Less certain is
whether it has established its legitimacy. Debate over the points that
the judiciary may reference in trumping legislative output now is essen-
tially where it was two centuries ago when Justices Iredell and Chase
argued the issue in Calder v. Bull:.3 Staking out the interpretivist po-
sition, Justice Iredell maintained that the judiciary exceeds its power
when it adverts to values beyond the four corners of the Constitu-
tion.44 The counterpoint to Iredell's position was Justice Chase's
noninterpretivist premise that democratic values are furthered rather
than retarded when the Court referenced natural law principles.45
Controversy over the Court's intellectual resources for "say[ing]
what the law is"46 has been supported and facilitated by a cottage in-
dustry of academic debate generating endless volumes of commentary
on the subject.47 Conventional wisdom has tended to cast the Warren
Court and Rehnquist Court as competing role models. Such character-
izations may be valid insofar as they only read results. To the extent
the judicial role is at issue, however, such a focus is misleading. Con-
stitutional outcome may be redirected not because the model of review
has changed but because different values have become primary analyti-
cal reference points. To the extent political or ideological consider-
ations are prime, methodologies of review - associated with the
Rehnquist Court's emphasis upon federalism and Warren Court's atten-
tion to fundamental rights - are theoretically indistinguishable.
43. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
44. Id. at 398-400 (Iredell, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 386-88.
46. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
47. See generally ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROG-
RESS (1970); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1993); JOHN H. ELY, DEMOC-
RACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules
Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781
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One jurist has noted that "[e]very justice has been accused of
legislating and everyone has joined in that accusation of others."48
Some critics already have cited the Rehnquist Court for violating the
ethos of restraint for which it is a self-proclaimed guardian.49 The
Court's reliance upon federalism in redefining the relationship between
the Constitution and state criminal procedure, therefore, at least has
reached the point of rousing suspicion that a tool of convenience rather
than principle is at work. Further casting doubt upon judicial motive is
an emphasis upon history possibly disengaged from historical perspec-
tive. In stressing concern with obliterating the "distinction of what is
national and what is local,"5 the Court has opened a window into its
institutional mind. Lurking therein is apparent concern with preserving
existing stru6tures from the forces of politically driven response to
evolving imperatives."
Such an agenda, if real, is at minimum incongruous. Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the architect of the Lopez opinion, typically has been among
the quickest to point a finger when perceiving that the Court ignores
history and impedes legislative response to the challenges of a soci-
ety. 2 Responding to arguments that a national economic emergency
required the Court to jettison its formalistic sense of commerce six
decades ago, Justice Sutherland asserted that "the meaning of the Con-
48. ROBERT JACKSON, THE SuPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERN-
MENT 80 (1955).
49. Particularly in the realm of substantive due process review, the Rehnquist Court
has touted the imperatives of judicial restraint. It thus has crafted a body of case law that,
for instance, acknowledges reproductive freedom but countenances regulatory schemes that
steer the decision-making of economically disadvantaged women. E.g., Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297 (1977). A contrary result, from the Court's perspective, would represent an exer-
cise in judicial overreaching. Id. at 298. To guard against such adventurism, Justice Scalia
has advocated determining whether a right is fundamental based upon examination of the
interest at a high level of specificity rather than abstraction. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491
U.S. 110, 127-28 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion) (holding that biological father's interest in
establishing a relationship with his child, when reduced from an abstraction to the specific
circumstances of parenthood arising from an extramarital affair is not a fundamental right).
50. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1632 (1995).
51. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
52. Rehnquist has characterized the Court's development of privacy rights, as a func-
tion of substantive due process review, as "closely attuned to . . . the majority opinion in
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stitution does not change with the ebb and flow of economic
events."53 If federalism itself has become a formalistic tool to shape
results for the sake of their outcome, history may condemn the Court
not only for disregarding the lessons of history but for a conspicuous
exercise in hypocrisy.
Having resculpted the constitutional context in which state criminal
procedure functions, and now limiting Congress in reaching criminal
activity, the burden rests with the exponents of federalism to convince
their audience that principle is logically ordained by the Constitution
rather than the work of another judicial excursion. Justice Kennedy has
illuminated the challenge confronting the Court in squaring its legacy
with its own standards for the judiciary's function. Noting the wide-
spread uncertainty regarding the existence and nature of criteria govern-
ing the deployment of federalism as a check on national power,54
Kennedy at least has acknowledged that the Court is operating in a
danger zone.
In a system hinged to consent of the governed, legitimacy is best
secured when ruling institutions convincingly explain their decisions.5
The Court's work over the past couple of decades reflects a significant
blunting of the Constitution's impact upon state criminal procedure.
Much of the Court's work on that front has been explained as the
invariable function of a system of dual sovereignty. With new evidence
that the concept of federalism is poorly understood and necessary stan-
dards unclarified, it becomes logical and fair to question the underpin-
nings of relevant post-Warren case law. For purposes of discerning
whether post-Warren revisionism has been driven by dogmatic or dem-
ocratic imperative, amplification of concepts, premises and standards -
essential for critical assessment of performance - has emerged as the
missing link to doctrinal and institutional insight.
53. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 402 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
54. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1637-38 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
55. See generally LIVELY, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED,
supra note 30, at 127.
[Vol. 98:923
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